Improving opinion poll reporting: the Irish Polling Indicator by Louwerse, T.P.
Improving Opinion Poll Reporting: The Irish
Polling Indicator
Tom Louwerse
Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Irish Political Studies∗†
Abstract
This article describes a statistical method for aggregating the information
from Irish opinion polls. Such aggregate estimates provide academic research-
ers with a time series of support for political parties, and inform the public better
about opinion polls by focusing on trends and uncertainty in these estimates. The
article discusses the challenge of aggregating opinion polls in a multi-party set-
ting with a comparatively limited number of polls available and presents daily es-
timates of party support for the 1987-2016 period. The article develops a method
to better model major sudden political and societal events, which have been com-
mon in Ireland since 2007. Finally, it discusses how polling aggregation estimates
can enhance opinion poll reporting in the media.
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Perhaps more than ever, opinion polls shape election campaigns (van der Meer, Hakhver-
dian and Aaldering, 2015). Journalists use polls to determine what and who to focus
on. Parties use them to help sell their message to voters. And voters rely on them
for strategic voting (Lago, Guinjoan and Bermúdez, 2015). Opinion polls regarding
the relative strength of each party take particular prominence, even outside of elec-
tion campaigns. Advances in phone and internet polling mean that more and more
polls are available. In Ireland, the two long-standing pollsters Ipsos MRBI and Mill-
ward Brown have been joined by Red C Research and, more recently, Behaviour &
Attitudes. Since 2011, an average of just over two opinion polls per month has been
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published, most of which received considerable attention in newspapers and on tele-
vision.
More opinion polls do not automatically imply better information for the pub-
lic, journalists, parties and researchers. Pollsters use dierent approaches and are
therefore likely to report diering results, not just due to random sampling error, but
systematic, long-term dierences due to design choices. This paper describes the Ir-
ish Polling Indicator, a method for aggregating the information contained in opinion
polls, taking into account both random error and systematic dierences between the
polls. It builds on earlier work in, among others, Australia, Canada, Germany and the
United Kingdom (Jackman, 2005; Fisher et al., 2011; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan,
2016; Walther, 2015; Cantu, Hoyo and Morales, 2015) and extends this to the Irish case,
which has a comparatively high number of political parties (compared to Canada and
Australia) and a relatively modest volume of polls (compared to the United Kingdom).
In addition, the paper discusses how major events that arguably shock public opinion
can be better incorporated into poll aggregation models. This is particularly relevant
for the Irish case, which has seen major economic challenges that aected people’s
party preferences at short notice.
The aim of the Irish Polling Indicator is twofold. First of all, by aggregating opin-
ion polls for each parliamentary term it provides a historical time series of party sup-
port that can be used in political research. While in anecdotal accounts of election
campaigns and governance, opinion polls seem to play a regular role, political sci-
entists have relatively recently begun to look at their impact on policy-making in
a more structural fashion (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Pickup and Hobolt, 2015; Ho-
bolt and Klemmensen, 2008). While opinion poll data are available for Ireland, it is
somewhat scattered and concerns individual polls only (ISSDA, 2015; Marsh, 2006).
Existing approaches to pooling opinion polls have focused on campaign polls only
(McElroy and Marsh, 2008). Secondly, opinion polls are regularly reported in news
media, with strong conclusions based on non-signicant poll changes featuring all
too often. Poll aggregation makes systematic dierences between polling companies
visible and stresses the uncertainty associated with these estimates.
1 Two Types of Error in Opinion Polls
Opinion polls are a classic example of using a sample to learn something about a
population. We are not interested in the political views of 1000 randomly selected
individuals as such, but we ask them for their opinions as this can tell us something
about the beliefs of the whole population. This does not mean that every sample will
be exactly reective of the population, as any introductory text on statistics will point
out. Often two types of error are distinguished: random and systematic error (King,
Keohane and Verba, 1994, 63).
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Random error varies between samples drawn from the same population. An im-
portant source of random error is sampling error. Because Irish opinion polls are
usually limited to around 1000 randomly selected people we might, just by chance,
encounter a higher percentage of Fine Gael voters among our thousand than there
are in the population as a whole. If we would repeat the sampling procedure the ran-
dom error is likely to be somewhat dierent. When using simple random sampling,
the size of this source of error is known, or to put it better: the Central Limit Theorem
informs us that the sampling distribution will be approximately normal. Sampling er-
ror is often presented as the sole source of error in the polls (‘the margin of error’),
but it only covers only random error due to sampling. Moreover, the usual equations
for calculating random error are only valid when each member of the population has
an equal chance of being sampled and these probabilities are independent. The Irish
pollsters that use face-to-face interviewing generally limit the number of physical loc-
ations of eldwork (‘sampling points’) to 64 (Millward Brown), 100-125 (Behaviour &
Attitudes) or 120 (Ipsos), interviewing between 10 and 15 people in each location.1 In
the past the number of sampling points was lower (and the number of interview per
location higher). This introduces clustering in the sample and without correction the
standard errors of estimated statistics will be underestimated (Kish, 1957; Arceneaux
and Nickerson, 2009). On the other hand, post-stratication can reduce the standard
error, especially if the weighting variables are strongly related to the variable of in-
terest. For example, if we know that women are more likely to support Labour and
we have accurate data about the percentage of women in the population, we can cor-
rect for any random under-representation (or over-representation) of women in the
sample. Eectively, the standard error for weighting variables will be reduced to zero.
As a result, variables that correlate highly with the weighting variables, will also show
less variability than under simple random sampling. All in all, it is more dicult to
estimate the size of the random error in real-world examples, because of the complic-
ations of the research design as well as other factors that may increase random error,
such as data entry errors, incomplete coverage, non-response, refusal to participate in
the survey and weighting procedures. The dierence between random sampling er-
ror and the total random error in a certain poll is sometimes called ‘pollster-induced
error’ or the ‘design eect’ (Fisher et al., 2011).
Systematic error, or bias, potentially presents a larger problems for opinion sur-
veys. While random error can largely be addressed by taking larger samples, sys-
tematic dierences between sample and population remain, no matter how large the
sample. The often cited example of Literary Digest, which used a heavily biased
sample of car owners and telephone users to – incorrectly – predict a Republican
landslide in the 1936 US presidential election, is a case in point. The sample was huge
1Pollster Red C makes use of Random Digit Dialling with a 50-50 split between mobile phones and
landlines.
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(they sent out 10 million ballots; 2.3 million returned), but contained a disproportional
number of high-income voters who favoured the Republican candidate. Moreover,
these Republicans were more likely to respond than the Democrats in the sample
adding further bias (Squire, 1988). Systematic error will remain even if a new sample
is drawn, while random error has an expected value of zero (it averages out across
many samples). Unfortunately there are many potential sources of bias, such as an
incomplete sampling frame and non-response. Moreover, people tend to overstate
their likelihood to vote, which means that not all respondents will be actual voters
(Crespi, 1988, 74). It is dicult to assess how large any systematic error is. Most poll-
sters apply (post)stratication weights based on demographic variables, such as sex
and age. While this is non-controversial, we know that these variables oer only a
partial explanation for the variation in political behaviour and hence samples that are
perfectly representative in terms of demographics may still be seriously biased with
regard to other variables (Brüggen, Van den Brakel and Krosnick, 2016). Sometimes
adjustments are made based on past experience. Some Irish pollsters used to weight
down Fianna Fáíl scores, which they seemed to overstate. Currently, polling company
Red C Research weights the data halfway between intended voting behaviour and re-
called voting behaviour in the previous election, assuming that people may overstate
change in party preference in polls. Behaviour & Attitudes weights based on previous
voting behaviour and likelihood to vote. Millward Brown and Ipsos MRBI currently
do not apply such adjustments (other than excluding don’t knows), although Ipsos
has done so in the past.
As we lack a ‘golden standard’, it is impossible to judge which approach is the
best. Even if we know what might have worked in previous elections (in terms of
observing a small dierence between the nal polls and the election outcome), there
is no guarantee that the same approach will work again. The recent elections in the
United Kingdom reect this very strongly (Mellon and Prosser, 2015). What we can
make visible is that there are systematic dierences between pollsters. Some pollsters
have a consistently higher estimate for certain parties, compared to other pollsters.
This is important to take into account when interpreting data from new polls. Poll
aggregation provides a way to take into account random error from polls by treat-
ing them as somewhat noisy signals as to true party support at a moment in time.
Moreover, we can estimate systematic dierences between pollsters, so-called house
eects.
2 A Statistical Model for Aggregating Polls
Over the past decade or so, political scientists have developed models to aggregate
information in individual opinion polls (Jackman, 2005; Fisher et al., 2011; Walther,
2015; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016; Cantu, Hoyo and Morales, 2015). Here,
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I present a variation of those models that is particularly suited to the Irish multi-party
case. This model is applied to each parliamentary term separately to allow parameters,
for example the ones that model systematic dierences between polling companies,
to dier between terms.
The rst part of the model describes what each poll tells us about the state of the
party. In particular, the model assumes that the proportion y of support for party p in
poll i is the sum of the ‘true’ party score on the day d that poll i was held (Apdi ) and
the ‘house eect’ for pollster b who did poll i (Hbi ), plus some random sampling error.
Under simple random sampling, the standard error sip for a party score in a poll can be
estimated as
√
yip (1−yip )
n . As Irish pollsters generally use a more complicated design
to select participants, especially in face-to-face polls, I account for the sampling error
being smaller or larger than expected under random sampling by a factor D, which
is estimated in the model.2 Combining this, I model each party’s score in each poll
as drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal to the ‘true’ party score and
the poll’s house eect and a variance equal to that expected under random sampling
times a ‘pollster-induced error’ measure3:
yip ∼ N (Apdi + Hb , s2ipD) (1)
where the variance parameter s2ip is calculated from the data (where ni stands for
the size of poll i):
s2ip =
yip (1 − yip )
ni
(2)
We are of course, most interested in the estimation of the ‘true’ population score
for each party. The model allows us to take into account both systematic and ran-
dom error. The systematic error is part of the ‘house eect’, which is assumed to be
constant across a parliamentary term.4 The random error is captured in the second
part of the formula, s2ipD. This model is similar to the one used by Jackman (2005),
Fisher et al. (2011) and Walther (2015). Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan (2016) use a
multinomial distribution to model the number of supporters for each party in a poll,
which is probably a more elegant approach than the normal approximation to the bi-
nomial distribution used here. The downside is that they are unable to incorporate
‘pollster induced error’ and therefore have to assume that each poll’s error is equal to
2Ideally, this parameter would be allowed to vary between pollsters. In practice, however, if this is
allowed, the model tends to estimate a tiny design eect for the most popular pollster, resulting in an
estimate that very closely follows the polls of that particular pollster. Pickup et al. (2011) report similar
issues. Therefore I estimate a single industry-level design eect.
3In the mathematical notation I will specify the variance of the normal distributions. The JAGS script
in the appendix uses the precision, which is the inverse variance.
4As Ipsos MRBI changed its adjustment method during the 1997-2002 and the 2007-2010 term, we split
these terms into multiple parts (three and two respectively) (Marsh and McElroy, 2003, 163). For each part,
we estimate the house eects separately (each subject to the zero-sum constraint discussed below).
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that under random sampling.5
The second part of the model describes how party support changes from day to
day, using a ‘random walk model’ or ‘Kalman lter’ (Jackman, 2005). This assumes
that party support can change somewhat from day to day, but is unlikely to jump up
and down greatly on a daily basis. This allows the model to infer which polls are likely
to be outliers. Most previous work has modelled party support today as a function
of party support yesterday plus or minus a certain amount of change (Jackman, 2005;
Fisher et al., 2011). In a multi-party setting one should, however, ensure that the total
support for all parties equals 100 per cent on any given day. I implement the approach
taken by Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan (2016), who model the random walk over
the log-ratios of party support (LApd ), with the rst party acting as the reference party
with a log-ratio of zero. For all other parties:
LApd ∼ N (LApd−1,τ 2p ) (3)
The parameter τ 2p is estimated from the data. I use a party-specic value of tau, as
some parties are more changeable than others. Moreover, because the random walk is
taken over the log-ratios, we would expect τ 2p to be much larger for very small parties
(with large negative log-ratios) than for parties that are equal in size to the reference
party (log-ratios close to zero).
To calculate the estimated vote share for each party from these log-ratios, the
following formula is used:
Apd =
exp (LApd )∑
exp (LAid )
(4)
This approach ensures that all estimated vote shares will be larger than 0, and also
ensures that the total sum of vote shares equals one.6
The house eects are constrained to average zero across pollsters. That is, we
assume that the average pollster does not deviate from the true population mean. In
that sense, this is an aggregation of polls and not an attempt to correct for any ‘in-
dustry bias’. Thus, if all pollsters overestimate a certain party, so will the aggregation
of polls.7
5Moreover, the implementation of the model is more dicult as the software used to estimate this model,
JAGS, does not allow for missing values in the vector of counts.
6 I also experimented with non-logged ratios, but this requires the implementation of a truncated normal
distribution in the random walk model, which means that the algorithm runs less quickly. The results,
however, were rather similar to the log-ratio approach.
7An alternative approach is to set A0 to the prior election result and assume that dierences between
that election and subsequent polls are due to house eects (Fisher et al., 2011). This strategy has the ad-
vantage that it allows us to correct for ‘industry bias’, that is under- or overestimation of a party by all
pollsters. The problem is, however, that relatively few polls are done after an election. In the Irish case this
is particularly true, with sometimes a few months passing between elections and the rst post-electoral
poll. One solution would be to x the parameter An , where n is the last day observed, to the subsequent
election result (Jackman, 2005). This option is, of course, only feasible for historical data, not the current
term. Moreover, one has to assume that the day-to-day change is similar in the nal stages of the election
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In the Bayesian implementation of the models, the following priors are used8:
τp ∼ Uni f orm(0, 0.2) (5)
Hpb ∼ Uni f orm(−0.2, 0.2) (6)
D ∼ Uni f orm(√1/3,√3) (7)
3 Data
Polling data were collected from a number of sources. For the most recent periods,
I obtained polling reports directly from the websites of the polling companies: Be-
haviour & Attitudes, Ipsos MRBI, Millward Brown and Red C Research. This allows
me to get specic data on the dates the eldwork was conducted, the number of re-
spondents as well as a detailed breakdown of party support, which includes most of
the minor parties. For the period before 2007, only Red C Research provides a full
archive on their website. I use three main other sources for that time period. First,
the Irish Opinion Poll Archive, which contains polls from IMS (now Millward Brown)
and TNS MRBI (now Ipsos MRBI) for the period 1970-1999, albeit not in a particularly
accessible format (Marsh, 2006). Second, the Irish Social Science Data Archive hosts a
series of opinion polls from TNS MRBI (2001-2008) and Millward Brown (2002-2005)
(ISSDA, 2015). Third, the online newspaper archives from the Irish Times and the Irish
Independent/Sunday Independent were searched. The TNS and Millward Brown polls
were commissioned by these newspapers and they reported extensively about the res-
ults, including a detailed breakdown of party support, eldwork dates and number of
respondents. In some cases, the results of earlier polls could be inferred from later
publications. All in all, the dataset contains 474 polls for the period 1982-2016. As
polling information is scarce before 1985, I limit my analysis to the period after the
1987 election. For some polls, it proved not possible to collect a detailed breakdown
of party support, for example when only the major parties were reported. These polls
were omitted from the analysis. In total 426 polls held between 1987 and 2016 were
used in the analysis.
The aggregation procedure detailed above was applied separately to each parlia-
mentary term. In each term all parties that were regularly included in the breakdown
of party support are included in the model.9 Minor parties, which were only some-
campaign compared to the entire period; this assumption might not necessarily hold.
8Strictly speaking, the house eect prior is over the unstandardized house eect. Also note that the
prior for the variance of the random walk is over τp rather than τ 2p .
9If a party’s support was not included in the breakdown of only a few polls, for these polls the party
support (as well as support for ‘others’) was dened as missing. One advantage of the aggregation model
7
times reported, were included in the ‘other’ category. If a party entered the frame
in between elections, its starting position was assumed to be drawn from a uniform
distribution between -10 and 10 on the log scale (LAd ); beforehand, its support was
xed at 0. If a party ceased to exist in between elections, its support was xed at 0 for
the remainder of the term. For example, after the Progressive Democrats disbanded
in 2008, it was no longer included in any polls and its support was xed at 0 in the
aggregation model.
I used the polls’ headline gures, which are often ‘adjusted’ to some extent, that
is, don’t knows were excluded, the data were weighted for demographic variables
and in some cases also for prior voting behaviour. There is a practical reason for
doing so, which is that the unadjusted data was not always available, but there is also
a substantive reason. For most of the research questions of interest, we would be
interested in party support in polls as reported at the time. While it is a worthwhile
academic exercise to arrive at retrospectively improved measures of support (using
unadjusted gures), if we want to use polling numbers to explain the behaviour of
political actors, we should work with the data available at the time. If the point of
the model is to make an accurate forecast of subsequent elections, one might nd
that it is better to work with unadjusted gures, although this is not a given. This
is, however, not the ambition here. Rather, I aim to give an accurate summary of the
polls. If all pollsters overestimate a certain party and this is reported in the media,
we might expect that actors respond to this (biased) result rather than true levels of
party support, which would be unknown to them. Similarly, if we want to inform
people better about the current state of public opinion, one can choose to forecast the
election result, making adjustments for any industry bias that might exist in polling
data. This approach has been successful in the United States, although equally rened
models failed to capture dynamics in the 2015 British elections (Silver, 2012). A more
moderate goal is to better inform the public about the current state of opinion polls.
This involves taking into account random error of polls and systematic dierences
between pollsters without correcting for any industry bias that might exist. These
models come with the obvious caveat that if all pollsters are wrong, the aggregate
will also underestimate or overestimate a particular party. On the upside, one has to
make fewer assumptions about corrections for industry bias, which often depend on
historical patterns. The aim of the Irish Polling Indicator is to inform people about
the information contained in opinion polls, not to forecast the election.
The model is estimated in JAGS (Plümmer, 2013), a software package for Markov
Chain Monte Carlo estimation. The JAGS scripts are included in the Appendix. I run
three chains, with 30,000 burn-in iterations and 60,000 iterations each (thinned by a
factor of 150). While there is a large degree of autocorrelation between the iterations,
above, estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods is that it allows for exibility regarding missing
values.
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Figure 1: Support for Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, Sinn Féin and the Progressive
Democrats 1987-2016
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Note: Mean estimates and 95% credible intervals (shaded). The dots represent election results.
especially in earlier terms with relatively few polls, the estimates are stable between
runs.
4 Results
Figure 1 displays the party support estimates for ve larger parties between 1987 and
2016. Fianna Fáil was the dominant party for much of this time, which is reected
by election results of around 40 per cent and polling estimates that were even higher
most of the time. Fine Gael played second ddle throughout most of this period, but
managed to gain the leading position in the 2011 election and has polled (mostly) well
since then. The traditional third party, Labour is generally supported by just over 10
per cent, with notable exceptions in the mid-1990s, around 2003 and between 2009 and
2012. Most recently, the part dropped well into single digits, achieving only 6.6 per
cent in the 2016 election. While these three parties are present for the whole of our
period of analysis, other parties come and go. The Progressive Democrats did quite
well in the late 1980s, but declined to a more modest level of support (around 5-6 per
cent) for most of the period afterwards. After the 2007 the party decided to disband
and therefore is displayed to have zero support in the remainder of the 2007-2011 term.
Sinn Féin, on the other hand, has seen its support increase greatly over the last two
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Figure 2: Support for the Green Party, Worker’s Party, Democratic Left and Others
1987-2016
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Note: Mean estimates and 95% credible intervals (shaded). The dots represent election results.
For the ‘Others’ category, the parties included in it vary from election to election.
decades. The party has been systematically included in polls since 1997; beforehand,
it was very small and usually included in the ‘other’ category of polls. Sinn Féin has
seen a steady growth of support, which reached about 10 per cent in the 2011 election.
The party polled very well (around 20 per cent) mid-2015, but achieved a somewhat
lower score of just under 14 per cent in the 2016 general election.
Among the smaller parties, we see a relatively modest presence of the Worker’s
Party and Democratic Left in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 2). The Green Party is
regularly included in polls from 1989 and shows a varying level of success: almost
always under 5 per cent during the 1990s, while in the 2002-2007 term support raised
just above that level. The party lost most of that support again, however, over the
course of the 2007 parliament, when it participated in a coalition government with
Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats. Since 2011, the Green Party has been a
very stable party at about 2 per cent. A remarkable development is visible for the cat-
egory of ‘others’, which includes both minor parties and independent candidates. This
category was relatively unimportant in the 1990s, generally polling under 5 per cent,
although support often peaked around elections and also seems to be underestimated
somewhat in the polls. In the 2000s, however, and particularly in the 2010s, support
for this group of parties and independents is rising very quickly to a point where to-
gether they formed the largest group in the polls. Indeed, independent candidates and
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Figure 3: A comparison between nal Polling Indicator estimates and General Election
results
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new parties did very well in the 2016 elections.
Party support is more variable during some terms than others. Take, for example,
the Labour party: we see large volatility in support between 1992 and 1997, with
relatively large credible intervals. In the subsequent term, Labour’s support was much
more stable, which results in more certainty in our estimates. For most parties, the
estimated intervals shrink considerably over time, in particular in the last period.
The reason is quite simple: the volume of polls increases a lot over time, with 46 polls
included in the analysis for 1992-1997, compared to 64 polls between 2007-2011 and
148 in the 2011-2016 parliamentary term. Taking into account dierences in length,
the number of polls per year increases from just over 7 in the rst period included, to
almost 30 in the most recent term. Prior to 2011, there would be considerable periods
of time without any polls being published, which results in a relatively large credibility
interval for those time periods. This is entirely correct, as we cannot be too certain
about the development of party preferences during those times.
Even though the aggregation model proposed in this paper is not intended as a
forecast model, observers might be interested to see in the dierences between nal
estimates and general election outcomes. After all, if an aggregate of polls would
bear no resemblance at all with the nal outcome, perhaps we should advice voters
and parties not to pay much attention to them. Figure 3 displays the Polling Indic-
ator estimate on the day before a general election (in black) and the outcome of that
election in grey. In a large majority of cases, the election result falls within the cred-
ible intervals of the model’s estimates. There are, however, a number of cases where
this is not true. In particular, there seem to be dierences between Fianna Fáil’s poll
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scores and their general election results. For the general elections in 1989, 1992, 1997
and 2002, the party consistently scored higher in the polls than in the general elec-
tions (the dierence is signicant in 1989 and 2002 but not in the other years). In
the early 2000s, polling companies started to ‘adjust’ their gures for this Fianna Fáil
over-representation, which actually resulted in an aggregate measure that seems to
have underestimated Fianna Fáil support in the 2007, 2011 and 2016 elections (al-
though in 2010 Ipsos MRBI had already ceased their use of adjustments). For other
parties, there are also occasional signicant dierences between the nal poll and the
election result, but this occurs in only one or two elections per party. Still, we do ob-
serve that generally both Fine Gael and Independents/Others seem to do somewhat
better on polling day than the average nal poll would suggest, at least up to 2007.
These dierences were not statistically signicant in most cases, but the stability of
the pattern across elections seems to suggest that the reverse side of the Fianna Fáil
over-representation in the polls as a (small) under-representation of Fine Gael and
Others.
Overall, the mean squared error of the dierence between the percentages ob-
tained in the nal Polling Indicator and the General Election result varied from 5.65
in the 2016 election, to only 0.97 in the 2011 election.10 The 2016 election suered
from an under-estimation of Fianna Fáil while Fine Gael was overestimated. In addi-
tion, in the 2016 elections the poll aggregation included fewer smaller parties, which
generally show a smaller error and therefore keep down the mean squared error11.
In earlier years, such as the poor showing at the 2002 election the error was usu-
ally focused on only one party (Fianna Fáil). Marsh and McElroy (2003) analyze the
2002 case in detail and nd that sampling bias is likely the main source of error, after
discarding alternative explanations (late swing, dierential turnout and dealing with
undecideds). In the remaining years the mean squared error was between 2 and 4.
While this does imply that predictions from the polls do contain error and likely also
bias for certain parties, overall the aggregation of polls does give a fair indication of
how parties will do on election day. On average, the aggregate of polls deviated from
the election result by between, on average, 0.73 per cent (2011) and 1.99 per cent per
party (2016). In most cases that is clearly better than the poorest poll and quite close
(or even better than) the best poll.
Systematic and Random Error
The aggregation model takes into account that there are systematic dierences between
pollsters, so-called house eects. The house eects reported here are to be interpreted
10Omitting parties that did not participate in these elections, but were polled on in the previous term
(WP 1992-1997 and PD 2007-2011).
11If we limit the MSE to the three traditional large parties in Irish politics, the mean squared error was
highest in 2002 (8.19), just before 2016 (7.12) and 2007 (6.98). The lowest mean squared errors for those
three parties occurred in 2011 (1.52).
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Figure 4: House eects in the Irish Polling Indicator (2011-2016)
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Note: dots display house eect for each pollster (95% credible intervals in black). B&A = Beha-
viour & Attitudes, Ipsos = Ipsos MRBI, MB = Millward Brown, Red C = Red C Research
as relative to the average pollster. In order to identify the model, house eects are as-
sumed to sum to zero. In this sense, the aggregation provides an average of the polls.
Basically, pollsters are estimated to consistently over- or underestimate party support
for a certain party compared to other pollsters. For example, in the 2011-2016 term, Red
C Research put Labour consistently higher by just shy of a percentage point, compared
to the average pollster (see Figure 4). This might be explained by the fact that Red C
weights its polls halfway between voting intention and previous voting behaviour.
As Labour did much better in the 2011 election than most of the polls between 2011
and 2016, weighting in previous voting behaviour is likely to increase Labour sup-
port. Figure 4 concerns the most recent completed term, which is most interesting as
four dierent pollsters were active during this period. There was no signicant house
eect for Fine Gael polls, but there was for the other parties. For Fianna Fáil, Be-
haviour & Attitudes is generally on the lower side, while Millward Brown was most
optimistic about this party’s fortunes. There are reasonably large house eects for
Sinn Féin, with both Red C and B&A showing negative house eects of -1 and Mill-
ward Brown and Ipsos MRBI display positive house eects of +1. This means that the
average polls for these pollsters dier by over 2 percentage points. There were also
considerable house eects for ‘others’, where Millward Brown was about 2.5 per cent
more negative about their support than Behaviour & Attitudes. While these eects
may not be groundbreaking, they are signicant and substantially relevant.
Apart from the systematic dierences between pollsters, the aggregation model
also takes into account that the random error associated with poll estimates may be
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Figure 5: Design eects
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Note: values indicate how many times larger the condence intervals of individual poll estim-
ates were estimated to be, compared to random sampling. A value of 1 would mean that the
random error associated with the polls would be exactly the same as under random sampling.
Larger values indicate that more error is associated with the poll estimates (error bars represent
95% credible intervals).
larger (or smaller) than under random sampling. In all but one of the terms studied,
this ‘design eect’ or ‘pollster-induced random error’ factor was indeed larger than
one, suggesting that polling estimates were more variable than to be expected un-
der random sampling (see Figure 5). This is not unexpected as many pollsters use
a limited number of sampling points for their face-to-face interviews. As a result,
there is an element of clustering in the sample, which should increase the standard
error somewhat. It is, however, dicult to be entirely sure of the size of this eect.
First of all, low polling volumes make it dicult to estimate this eect very precisely,
with the prior distribution on parameter D aecting the estimates. In the most recent
term, however, poll estimates were also be found to show more variability than is to
be expected under random sampling, while for this period we do have a relatively
large sample of polls (and the prior distribution has much less eect on the ndings).
Therefore, we can be reasonably sure that pollster-induced error does play a role in
the Irish case with error margins likely to be somewhat underestimated by the simple
formulas used for the case of random sampling.
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5 Incorporating Shocks Into Poll Aggregation Mod-
els
Poll aggregation models are good at distilling trends from (noisy) polling data. When
one new poll with remarkable outcomes is published, one’s response should be ‘it is
only one poll’, and that is exactly how aggregation models treat these polls. Inform-
ation from the new poll is compared to previous polls. If the new poll is somewhat
higher than the polling average, even correcting for house eects, it is much more
likely to be just noise than represent a ‘real’ trend. Thus, polling aggregation models
dampen outliers and are generally somewhat conservative about ‘breaking polls’.
While this is generally a good approach, in certain situations it might lead the
aggregation models to underestimate change. If a party drops ve percentage points
in the polls after a major corruption scandal, that is much more likely to represent
a true eect than if the same change happens after the party was not in the news at
all. In other words: if there is prior information about important political events that
should aect our beliefs as to whether drops or increases in party polls represent true
eects.
The random walk model used in the model above allows party support to change
more on some days than on others. Still, change is estimated to be relatively small
from day to day. This is true for most days, but there are major political events that
seem to ‘break through the random walk’. Mid-term elections and important societal
events, such as the Bank Guarantee in Ireland in 2008, are examples. After such events,
party support might change dramatically overnight. Such change might be so extreme
that the random walk parameter does not represent it very well.
The proposed solution here is to modify the random walk model, by multiplying
τp by a factor γs :
LApd ∼ N (LApd−1,τ 2pγps ) (8)
where s represents the instance of shock, with s = 1 representing the normal
random walk and s = 2, 3, ...,n representing days with major political events:
γ1 = 1 (9)
γs ∼ Uni f orm(1, 100), for s > 1 (10)
Eectively this means that on ‘shock days’ support for a party is allowed to make
a much bigger step in the random walk than on normal days. As γs is estimated in the
model, it is not necessary that there will be a large change in party support on those
‘shock days’: if polls before and after the ‘shock day’ are stable, γs will be estimated
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Figure 6: Support for Fianna Fáil 2008-2010
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to be (close to) unity. If there is a large change in polls, however, the γs parameter
makes it much more likely that this is interpreted as real change rather than a large
outlier in the polls. This is reasonable, because our knowledge about relevant political
circumstances indeed tells us that changes in party support around the time of the
‘shock day’ are likely to be real.
Ireland 2008-2010
The nancial and economic crisis has dominated Irish politics since the 2007 elec-
tions. In particular in the 2007-2011 term there were large changes in voters’ party
preferences. Fianna Fáil lost its long-time-dominant position and ended up as the third
party at the 2011 election. The economic and nancial crisis presented a number of
shocks, both to the economy as well as to public opinion. Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012)
identify two important moments in particular: the introduction of the bank bailout
on 30 September 2008 and the Withdrawal from the bond market by the Irish state on
30 September 2010. These shocks arguably aect public opinion regarding the main
government party of the day, Fianna Fáil.
The Irish Polling Indicator does not, however, show particularly large changes in
public opinion around those dates. The green line in gure 6 shows that while there
was a decline in support around those two pivotal moment in the economic crisis,
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the timing was o. If we look at individual polls, however, we do see a large decline
before and after the Bank Guarantee (from 36 per cent to 26 per cent in the Red C
Research polls). The aggregation model, however, seems to smooth out this decline
over a longer period of time, implicitly assuming that the September polls might just
be a little on the high side and the October polls a bit on the low side. Something
similar is visible in 2010, when the Fianna Fáil declines, but only from the end of
October.
When the model is rerun with the ‘shock’ specication outlined above, the shocks
to party support appear to be larger than in the original model. Support for Fianna Fáil
is estimated to remain at about 34 per cent before the Bank guarantee was announced,
to drop to just under 30 per cent the day after. Similarly, at the end of September
2010 party support drops by about 3.5 per cent after Ireland withdraws from the bond
markets. In both cases the decline is not quite as pronounced as individual polls seem
to suggest. In 2008 this is reective of the fact that later polls gave somewhat higher
estimates for Fianna Fáil than the 26 per cent low in October 2008. In 2010, party
support was not quite as high in the Polling Indicator (21.5 per cent) compared to an
Ipsos poll just taken before the withdrawal (24 per cent).
The modication suggested above seems to be able to capture sudden changes in
party fortunes better than the normal specication. The good news for polling ag-
gregation methods is that after some time, both the ‘normal’ and ‘shock’ measures
converge. Still, if one is interested in the impact of one specic important political
event on party support, the ‘shock’ modication seems appropriate as not to under-
estimate changes in public opinion in the short term.
We can further analyze the eect of the two major economic events on Fianna
Fáil support by replicating the analysis in Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012). Using polling
data from Red C Research, they estimated a simple regression model in which sup-
port for Fianna Fáil was modelled as a function of ve variables. Two of the ve were
dummy variables: Bank Guarantee (0 before the Bank Guarantee, 1 afterwards) and
Withdrawal from the bond market (0 before, 1 after). Three others were continuous
time variables. Time starts at 0 at the month of the election in 2007 and increases
by 1 every month. ‘After Bank Guarantee’ is 0 before the Bank Guarantee and then
increases by 1 every month afterwards. Similarly, ‘After withdrawal from bond mar-
ket’ is coded 0 before that 2010 event and increasing after. The simple model used
by Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012) is well-equipped to explain variation in Fianna Fáil
support (see Table 1). The Adjusted R squared for their model is 0.83 with a root
mean squared error of 3.3. They nd a strong eect of both the Bank Guarantee and
Withdrawal from the bond market on Fianna Fáil support.
I replicated the analysis using the ‘shock model’ time series presented above.12
12The analysis of Marsh and Mikhaylov starts in September 2005; therefore, for the period between
September 2005 and 2007 I use the estimates from the regular polling indicator for that time period.
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Table 1: Explaining support for Fianna Fáil 2005-2011
Model 1 (MM) Model 2 (TL)
(Intercept) 35.32∗∗∗ 35.82∗∗∗
(1.05) (0.09)
Time 0.08 0.07∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.00)
Bank Guarantee −10.71∗∗∗ −11.70∗∗∗
(2.05) (0.15)
After Bank Guarantee −0.35∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.01)
Withdrawal from bond market −4.57∗∗∗ −3.65∗∗∗
(1.12) (0.28)
After withdrawal from bond market 0.07 −0.34∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.09)
Adj. R2 0.83 0.96
Num. obs. 66 1999
RMSE 3.3 1.54
Note: Model 1 has been reproduced from Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012, p. 481).
∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗p < .01, ∗p < .05
Because this model presents an estimate of party support for each day, rather than
using each month as a case, I used daily data. To allow for an easy comparison between
the models, my time variables are expressed in (fractions of) months as well.
The main ndings are very similar between models (see Table 1). I nd a large
impact of the Bank Guarantee on Fianna Fáil support in the slightly longer run. Al-
though the immediate eect of the Bank Guarantee was estimated to be just over 4
per cent, levels of support for Fianna Fáil declined further to a much lower level after
the Bank Guarantee. This eect is estimated to be almost 12 percentage points. The
Withdrawal from the bond market also aected Fianna Fáil support negatively, by
about 3.7 percentage points, according to Model 2. Moreover, I nd negative time
trends after the major economic events. The model t for this daily time series is very
good (R2ad j = 0.96), which is even higher than the Marsh & Mikhaylov model.
13 One
explanation might be that the aggregation model presents less ‘noisy’ indicators of
party support in polls than individual polls do; therefore, it would be easier to explain
the variance in that support using structural explanations.14
13This is also true (R2ad j = 0.96) when we limit the model to one observation per month resulting in 66
monthly observations.
14I also replicated the Marsh & Mikhaylov model using the original Irish Polling Indicator series. Findings
are similar except for Withdrawal from bond market, which loses signicance. This seems to support the
case for taking into account major events when modelling opinion polls.
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6 Discussion: UsingPollAggregationTo ImproveMe-
dia Reports of Opinion Polls
The results show that both random error and systematic dierences between pollsters
should be taken into account when interpreting opinion poll results. This is exactly
where poll aggregation can be used to improve media coverage of opinion polls. The
rst lesson to be taken from this would be that reports on opinion polls should take
account of all available polls, not just those from one company that did the most
recent poll. The Irish Polling Indicator makes house eects, systematic dierences
between pollsters, explicit. Part of the explanation why a party might do particularly
well in a poll might be that it always does better in polls by that pollster. Even when
media outlets report in detail about a specic poll commissioned by them, they should
not prove blind and deaf to the information contained in other polls. They help to
interpret the results: is this increase for a party likely to represent true change, or
might it just be random noise? It would of course be even better to report the results
of poll aggregation models alongside with individual polls. This puts the individual
poll into context and shows that random and systematic error should be taken into
account.
The second lesson is to take account of uncertainty associated with polls. While
most academics are at ease when dealing with uncertainty, it sometimes seems to irk
journalists and the general public. This all too often leads to one of two responses:
either to forget about uncertainty altogether and interpret all changes in polling sup-
port as real or to argue that polls tell us absolutely nothing because of all that un-
certainty involved. This black and white view of opinion polls does not do justice to
their usefulness. While Irish media do quite often include basic relevant information
about opinion polls, such as when the poll was taken, the number of respondents
and the associated margin of error, sometimes the description of the results does not
take account of the disclaimer. Regularly, small dierences between parties and small
changes in parties’ fortunes are interpreted as ‘true’, while these are quite likely to
represent random error (‘noise’). Many media could do a better job at reporting un-
certainty margins associated with polls. Data from the Irish Polling Indicator is very
suitable for this aim. The Bayesian specication of the models allows for an intuitive
understanding of the uncertainty (credibility intervals) associated with the estimates.
It is easy and correct to report that ‘according to the Irish Polling Indicator, we are
95% certain that support for Fine Gael lies between 25 and 29 per cent’.15 Moreover,
it is possible to directly estimate the probability that a party saw its support increase
or decrease compared to one week or month ago, as the Polling Indicator produces
15Note that condence intervals associated with frequentist statistics, such as error margins associated
with individual opinion polls, cannot generally be interpreted this way. Frequentist 95% condence inter-
vals should contain the population mean in 95% of times across an innite number of replications.
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draws from the posterior distribution of the variables of interest. Similarly, we can
calculate from the posterior distribution whether one party is larger or smaller than
another one.
The third lesson would be to use polls for what they are good at: describing and
explaining trends. As far as describing the trend goes, polling aggregation provides
richer data than individual pollsters can, because it takes into account all available
data. When it comes to explaining (changes in) party support, however, specic polls
have much to add. They can provide insight in which voters change their party prefer-
ence: where do they come from, what is their background and what are their views?
Reports of individual polls should, more than is the case now, focus on this added
value. This way polling aggregation and results from individual polls can be com-
bined to provide better insights into voters’ preferences.
7 Conclusion
This article presented a poll aggregation method for Irish election that has the poten-
tial to inform voters better about parties’ political fortunes. It tackles the challenge
of aggregating opinion polls in a multi-party setting with a limited number of polls
outside election time, especially before 2007. This contribution is particularly relev-
ant for voters and political actors in Ireland, who may use the results to gain a better
understanding about strengths and limitations of opinion polls. In comparative terms,
the model presented here combines various insights in opinion poll aggregation. It
moves beyond the two-party case by modelling support for all parties together, ensur-
ing that support sums to 100 per cent (Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016). At the
same time, it incorporates house eects as well as an estimate of design eects, which
makes explicit that random polling error is usually larger in the Irish case than under
simple random sampling (Fisher et al., 2011). Finally, it presents a way to incorpor-
ate shocks to the political system into the model. This makes poll aggregation more
useful in cases where we want to estimate the eect of an event on party support. Fur-
ther work is, however, necessary to explore the consequences of the proposed ‘shock’
adjustment in other settings.
Work on the Irish case could be extended in multiple directions. First, one could
use these estimates as a starting point for estimating the number of seats each party
stands to win (Fisher et al., 2011; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016). Because
of the complications of the Single Transferable Vote system in small multi-member
constituencies and the importance of vote transfers, this would require additional
data and modelling regarding the geographical distribution of party support as well as
transfer patterns between parties. Second, one could move from an aggregation model
of opinion polls to a forecast model of elections. To do this, one needs to take into
account historical patterns of polling bias, as well as the additional error involved in
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projecting current polls onto election results in the future. Work on this in the United
States and the United Kingdom has achieved a high level of sophistication, which
could be used to pursue a similar enterprise in Ireland. While election forecasting per
se should perhaps not be a primary aim of academic political science research, these
studies help us to understand biases and uncertainty in polling better and thereby
help to contribute to a better understanding of opinion polls by parties, journalists
and hopefully the general public.
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A JAGS code for model estimation
The models presented here are are based on those presented by Jackman (2005) and
Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan (2016), using parts of their JAGS/BUGS code.
Main model
model{
# Equation 1: Define reported poll percentage as sum of true percentage
# and house effect
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
for(i in poll_start[k]:poll_end[k]){
mu[i,k] <- alpha[date[i],k] + house[org[i],k,houseperiods[i]]
y[i,k] ~ dnorm(mu[i,k],prec[i,k])
prec[i,k] <- 1 / (vari[i,k] * pie)
}
}
# Equation 2: Random walk model
# For party 1, we have specified alphalog = 0 in data
for(k in 2:NPARTIES) {
alphalog[period_start[k] - 1, k] ~ dunif(logstart_min[k],logstart_max[k])
for(i in period_start[k]:period_end[k]){
alphalog[i,k] ~ dnorm(alphalog[i-1,k],tau[k])
}
}
# Equation 3: Derive alphas from alphalog
for(i in 1:NPERIODS){
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
alphaexp[i,k] <- exp(alphalog[i,k])
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alpha[i,k] <- alphaexp[i,k] / sum(alphaexp[i,])
}
}
# Equation 4: Prior over random walk
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
tau[k] <- pow(sigma[k], -2)
sigma[k] ~ dunif(0,.2)
}
# Equation 5: Prior over house effect + sum-to-zero constraint
for(j in 1:NHOUSEPERIODS) {
for(i in 1:NHOUSE){
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
house_us[i,k,j] ~ dunif(-.2,.2)
house[i,k,j] <- house_us[i,k,j] - inprod(house_us[,k,j],
houseweights[,j])
}
}
}
# Equation 6: Prior over pollster induced error
pie ~ dunif(1/3, 3)
}
Shocks model
model{
# Equation 1: Define reported poll percentage as sum of true percentage
# and house effect
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
for(i in poll_start[k]:poll_end[k]){
mu[i,k] <- alpha[date[i],k] + house[org[i],k,houseperiods[i]]
y[i,k] ~ dnorm(mu[i,k],prec[i,k])
prec[i,k] <- 1 / (vari[i,k] * pie)
}
}
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# Equation 7: Random walk model
# For party 1, we have specified alphalog = 0 in data
for(k in 2:NPARTIES) {
alphalog[period_start[k] - 1, k] ~ dunif(logstart_min[k],logstart_max[k])
for(i in period_start[k]:period_end[k]){
alphalog[i,k] ~ dnorm(alphalog[i-1,k],tau[k] * shocksize[shocknumber[i]])
}
}
# Equation 3: Derive alphas from alphalog
for(i in 1:NPERIODS){
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
alphaexp[i,k] <- exp(alphalog[i,k])
alpha[i,k] <- alphaexp[i,k] / sum(alphaexp[i,])
}
}
# Equation 4: Prior over random walk
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
tau[k] <- pow(sigma[k], -2)
sigma[k] ~ dunif(0,.2)
}
# Equation 5: Prior over house effect + sum-to-zero constraint
for(j in 1:NHOUSEPERIODS) {
for(i in 1:NHOUSE){
for(k in 1:NPARTIES) {
house_us[i,k,j] ~ dunif(-.2,.2)
house[i,k,j] <- house_us[i,k,j] - inprod(house_us[,k,j],
houseweights[,j])
}
}
}
# Equation 6: Prior over pollster induced error
pie ~ dunif(1/3, 3)
# Equation 8,9: Define priors for shocks
shocksize[1] <- 1
for(i in 2:NSHOCKS) {
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shocksize[i] ~ dunif(0.0001,1)
}
}
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